The views expressed here have been developed on the basis of my personal impressions of the present crisis, my understanding of the Bush Administration's Iran policy, and my experiences in the area of US-Iran relations during the past two decades. During my years of activity on US-Iran relations I have always tried to provide, as objectively as possible, realistic analyses and predictions about the relations between the two countries, and even to help create important opportunities for the settlement of the differences, which, unfortunately, were not taken advantage of. I have no doubt that this time as well there will be forces inside both countries who will disagree with the views outlined here. But notwithstanding the approval or disapproval with which these views may meet, I would like to assure every one of the honesty and unwavering commitment upon which my views are based. I would like to think that, despite the atmosphere of nuclear nationalism that prevails in Iran today, the government of the Islamic Republic will provide adequate response, based on the national interests of Iran, to the proposal put forth by the United States and its allies. I hope that this will be the case.

The Iranian nuclear crisis is in fact only one part of the many complicated problems facing the two countries, which, in turn, is a result of the anti-Iran activities within the United States. In other words, this crisis, rather than being a general concern of the European Union, Russia, China and other countries, is more specifically an Iran-US and Iran-Israel problem. Nevertheless, issues like non-proliferation, terrorism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the growth of authoritarian states, are all global issues that extend beyond US-Iran relations. Therefore, the settlement or lack thereof of the problems confronting Iran-US relations directly affects the world beyond the two countries, a clear example of which is the present nuclear crisis. In fact, had the relations between Iran and the United State been normal, Iran, like Pakistan, would surely have been allowed to enter the club of nuclear energy powers. In reality, the world of international relations is the world of national interests, not that of rights, friendship or animosity.

Unfortunately, despite the critical importance of the resolution of the crisis between Iran and the United States, both the domestic political culture within the two countries and the international forces outside of them have on the whole acted in the direction of escalation of this crisis between the two countries. Within Iran, the political debate is framed almost entirely in terms of either complete animosity towards the United States or complete subservience to it, even though there are others who have an instrumentalist attitude toward the US. But the national interests of the country require that the relations between the two countries be defined within a totally different framework. The lack of such a framework is more than anything else a result of inadequate attention to the need for a more precise definition of Iran's national interests, which, in turn, derives from a flawed approach to nation- and state-building in Iran. At the same time, those opposed to improved US-Iran relations are numerous within the region and beyond. While Israel's animosity towards such relations is quite obvious to everyone, unfortunately less attention is being paid to the acts of sabotage perpetrated by the Arab states, Turkey and Pakistan. These countries do not see the resolution of the problems between Iran and the United States in their own interests. For them, the increased weight of an Iran that stands on the side of the United States would shift the regional balance too far in Iran's favor.

Of course, the factors behind the present crisis are not limited merely to flawed approaches and the hostile activities of other countries intent upon sabotaging US-Iran relations. At present, Iran is judged by the UN Security Council as being a rogue state due to its mistakes in development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, to which it has a legitimate right. The government of the Islamic Republic, despite of its many mistakes and flaws, does not deserve to be treated as a nuclear criminal! Despite the fact that the European countries, Russia and China were ready to vote for a partial imposition of the provisions of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter at the last meeting of the Security Council, the United States persistently pursued the total imposition of Chapter VII, which would result in comprehensive international sanctions and the use of military force against Iran. The fact of the matter is that a pro-war faction within the United States has been officially pursuing the policy of regime change in Iran for a long time. It is intent on achieving this goal through international isolation of Iran, the use of force and destabilization of the Islamic Republic, on the pretext of Iran's uranium enrichment project. By artificially exaggerating the issue of enrichment, the enemies of Iran and US-Iran relations are in fact setting a trap -- a trap which I call the Enrichment Trap.

The pro-war enemies of Iran in the United States are persistently following this policy of destruction and overthrow. They do not even concern themselves with the possibility of the US itself being damaged in the process, nor do they concern themselves with the possibility that the United States might alienate itself from all of its allies within the region through its actions. Fortunately, the anti-war movement within America has also entered the scene against the pro-war movement in America. The former, in concert with anti-war movements throughout the rest of the world, particularly in Europe, is exerting heavy pressures on the Bush Administration to engage in direct negotiations with Iran. They argue that the Bush Administration, while claiming to treat the use of military force as the "last resort" in dealing with Iran's nuclear project, has never conducted direct negotiations with Iran and is thus ignoring the "first resort," which is the diplomatic path. They believe that before any use of military force, all political and diplomatic means must first be exhausted. But the fact is -- and this is something the leaders of Iran must pay close attention to -- that even the anti-war movement is demanding that Iran must stop the enrichment process. Indeed, it was based on these pressures and the anti-war movement's opposition to the enrichment process that the Bush Administration agreed to join Europe in its proposal to Iran.

Although the pro-war and anti-war movement in the United States and beyond are in agreement with regard to the need for the Islamic Republic to suspend the enrichment process, their objectives in raising this demand are different. While the anti-war movements see the halting of the enrichment process as a step towards the resolution of the conflicts between the two countries, for the pro-war movement this demand has a tactical nature, i.e., they do not really want Iran to stop the enrichment process. Rather, they are disingenuously raising this demand in the hope that Iran would refuse to submit to it. Based on Iran's previous behavior, they are certain that the Islamic Republic will once again reject the offer and would thus provide them with the rationale to turn the public opinion against Iran, convince Europe, Russia and China about the impossibility of a political solution to the problem, and justify a military action against Iran. In fact, the biggest nightmare for these pro-war movements would be the suspension of the enrichment process, if even for only a short period of time. They want nothing less than war with Iran and its destruction. Their goal is the reduction of Iran's power and the overthrow of the Islamic regime. The enrichment issue is just a pretext for them to achieve this goal.

On the basis of these obvious facts, Iran must pursue a policy that, in the short-run, seeks to defuse the possibility of a military confrontation with the United States and, in the long-run, leads to the normalization of US-Iran relations on the basis of Iran's national interests. The Bush Administration must help in the successful conclusion of such a policy if adopted by Iran. The correctness of this policy can be better understood if we take note of the fact that the "no war no peace" situation that has existed between Iran and the United States over the past 27 years can no longer continue. In the near future, Iran and the United States will be forced to choose between war and peace. At the same time, the internal situation in Iran testifies to the fact that mending fences with the United States, and not continuing this animosity, is ultimately in the best interest of Iran. A great number of those who voted for Mr. Ahmadinejad did so in the hope of improving their lives, not because of Iran's nuclear project. As the past experience has shown, Iran cannot count on the support of Russia, China or Europe in a confrontation with the United States; nor can it rely on the majority of the states in the region or the non-governmental Islamic forces that support it. To overcome the crisis, Iran can only count on its own people. But the Iranian people are more concerned with their daily lives than with nuclear projects.

Iran must do its best to ensure the success of the proposal put forth by the United States, Europe, Russia and China. Iran must carry out all future negotiations from the position of strength, which can only derive from the support of its people. At the same time, it must adopt a realistic and professionally precise approach towards these negotiations and formulate its demands in a manner which takes into account all aspects of the nuclear crisis as well as the existing internal problems and external animosities. It must also pay close attention to the Bush Administration's motives and objectives in supporting the recent proposal. The fact of the matter is that, while it has proposed direct negotiations with Iran and has agreed to drop some sanctions against the Islamic Republic, the Bush Administration still refuses to discount a military solution or abandon its regime change policy. In confrontation with a powerful and imposing opponent like the United States, any decision that does not take into account the existing reality, including Iran's strengths and weaknesses -- be it in favor of resistance or compromise -- will inevitably be harmful to Iran's national interests. The past approaches -- like Iran's response to the Clinton Administration's offers for resolving the differences, the manner in which the issue of the American hostages was handled, and the way the Iraqi-imposed war on Iran was brought to an end -- cannot be repeated. This time, missing this opportunity will be much more damaging to the country.

Of course, it is up to the leaders of the Islamic Republic to decide which policy would best serve Iran's national interests at this critical historical juncture - confrontation or compromise. It is clear that the United States and its allies would not consent to anything less than a halt to enrichment and the reprocessing of plutonium from the spent fuel. While negotiating on definitions, conditions and duration of the suspension of the enrichment process, the government of the Islamic Republic must be prepared to accept a compromise once the necessary guarantees is provided by the other side with regard to the legitimate national rights of Iran, its national and energy security, and the security of the Islamic regime. It is my belief that, by following a realistic policy with regard to this issue, the Islamic Republic will be able to make the warmongers' worst nightmare come true, disperse the forces that have gathered against it, and strengthen the hands of the American and international peace forces in favor of its national interests.
In conclusion, I would like to stress that, at this critical moment, the main prerequisite for defusing the present crisis is that the forces arrayed against Iran be deprived of their support. This objective can best be served by expanding democratic practices throughout Iranian society and coming to an understanding with the West, both of which are ultimately in Iran's national interests. Unfortunately, at the present juncture, Iran may be forced to choose between the lesser of the two evils -- either suspending the enrichment or continue with the dangerous spiral conflict. It is my hope that such a choice can be avoided and a third option that would guarantee the national interests of Iran and the US will be found. It is also my hope that the Bush Administration understands that its best option with Iran is to avoid a military confrontation. The interests of both sides are better served with a serious engagement where both the incentives and the disincentives are made very large - the Big Deal approach that this author has for a long time advocated.

Hooshang Amirahmadi is Professor and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, and President of the American Iranian Council in Princeton. www.amirahmadi.com ; hooshang@amirahmadi.com