The pattern of Iraq in U.S.-Iranian relations is that of a pendulum: From the 1970s-1980, the U.S. supported Iran in the Cold War. Iraq was a problem for Iran. From the perspective of the USSR and the Arab World, Iraq was the "balancer" to Iran. From 1980-1990, particularly during the horrific and costly Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was a problem for Iran. The U.S. was on the side of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. From 1990-2003, Iraq became a problem for the U.S. beginning with Hussein's war with Kuwait. The U.S. initiated a policy of dual containment against both Iran and Iraq. From 2003 to the present, Iraq became a problem for the U.S. again. The new Shi'a Iraqi government is on Iran's side. What is the explanation for this Iraqi pendulum? Iraq did not have to be what it is today.

A "spiral conflict" is a relationship in which "both parties escalate each other's extreme positions to new heights, based on a mixture of fact and fiction, misperceptions and misunderstandings, distrust and demonization." In order for this spiral conflict to be reversed, careful analysis is necessary. This analysis should help to indicate what should be done. Perhaps then it might be possible to convert this relationship into one of "spiral cooperation."

I. Old Factors: Ill-Conceived U.S. Policies, Mutual Mistrust & Mutual Misperceptions

Though Iraq is very much a product of the 1953 coup, it is also a product of two other old factors, especially: (1.) a longstanding Western pattern of misperception and mistrust of Iran, and (2.) the U.S. belief that Iran is a "dangerous" country. Of the many U.S. policies toward Iran, one very particular policy has been deeply destructive of the relationship, namely, the 1953 coup. This coup, in which Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, the democratically elected President of Iran, was

overthrown by the West, was a seminal event in the relationship. This Western coup had a domino effect across the region. It was initiated under the pretext of preventing Iran from nationalizing its oil, led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The 1979 Revolution led to the U.S.¬Iran spiral conflict, to Israeli-Iranian animosity, to the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran, and to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Iraq, now virtually bankrupt after its war with Iran, invaded Kuwait (1990) which was, of course, followed by the 1991 and 2003 U.S. wars with Iraq. These wars led the removal of Saddam Hussein and to a gradual Shi'a takeover of Iraq. These and other developments (e.g., Afghanistan (2001) and the removal of the Taliban) have created the perception that Iran itself is a "rising power." This perception of Iran has led the Bush Administration to overweight the importance of Iran in the Iraqi problem. This overweighting now appears ready to lead to yet a new phase of this spiral conflict.

The U.S. came relatively late to Iran. The American understanding of the country was deeply infused with British perceptions. In this sense, the Americans did not come to Iran with a new and clean approach. Mistrust and misperceptions were endemic to the U.S. understanding of the region from the very beginning. What of the perception that a strong Iran may be a cost to the U.S.? What of the perception that a weak Iran may be a benefit to it? The fact is that over the last 100 years, whenever the Iranians have tried to move in the direction of development and democracy, the West has considered it dangerous. When the Iranians staged the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the British and Russians tried to destroy it and, in the end, had success in doing so by ending the movement through a coup that brought Reza Shah to power in 1921. In the 1930s, the British refused to help Iran develop its railways, alleging that it would help Russia to access the Persian Gulf. Yet, after Iran built the railways with little outside help, the Allies used it to move soldiers and war material to Moscow in order to defeat the Nazis. Iran was then declared the "Bridge to Victory." In 1953, when the Iranians wanted to nationalize their oil, the British intelligence service, with support from the CIA, overthrew Dr. Mosaddeq alleging that the Iranian nationalists would allow the communist penetration of Iran through the pro-Russian Tudeh Party. In the 1960s, the West refused to help Iran build its steel industry. Mohammad Reza Shah had then to turn to the USSR for this industrial support. In 1979, when the Iranians overthrew the Shah, hoping to establish a democratic republic, the U.S. tried to change its path through a series of attempted coups. The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s appeared to confirm Iranian suspicions about U.S. intentions. Few states came to Iran's aid even through it was clear that Iraq was the aggressor. Even Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction against Iranian civilians did not bring the international community around to helping Iran. Today, the Iranians seek to develop their nuclear energy industry and the Bush Administration wonders why an oil producing state would need to develop this industry.

Before turning to the new factors influencing the U.S.-Iranian relationship, it is helpful to explore certain aspects and assumptions of these old factors, especially the factors of mistrust and misperception. Is Iran a country not to be trusted, especially as a strong state? Is Iran, as a weak state, better for the region, the world and for the U.S.? In the last 250 years, Iran has not initiated any hostile invasion of any other country. Even when Iran has been strong, it has not invaded another state. However, whenever Iran has been weak, it has been subjected to invasions from foreign aggressors. Whenever Iran has been strong, it has contributed to regional stability. The assumption that "a weak Iran is a better Iran" is one which lies at the heart of the intellectual basis for sanctions. While the ultimate result of these sanctions has been a weaker Iran, they have also created a more assertive and less democratic Iran. This feeds into the assumption that Iran simply cannot be trusted. In the U.S., hard power advocates hold that military attacks on Iranian nuclear and military installations are logical and appropriate. These advocates hold that, in the absence of balancing regional forces, the destruction of Iran's power by the U.S. is the best option to check Iran's regional ambitions. These same advocates ignore many of the region's complicating facts, such as the nuclear energy/weapons programs of India, Pakistan, and Israel.

A weaker Iran is not necessarily a "better" Iran. Had the 1979 Revolution not weakened Iran, Saddam Hussein would not have initiated the 1980 invasion. The aftermath of this war has put the whole region into an unstable condition. A stronger Iran may well be a "better" Iran. A stronger, friendlier, more democratic and more secure Iran is surely preferred over a weaker and more dictatorial state.

II. New Factors: Global, Regional and National

Although these old factors present serious problems for the U.S.-Iranian relationship, it is now true that a series of new factors is now causing further complications. What was already a complex problem is now more complex. Though certainly not intractable, it is one that requires deep and cautious reflection. Iraq has become a problem in many new ways.

Issues of global significance include: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the Middle East peace process, human rights, democratization and modernization. Global warming and carbon energy production/consumption are also issues now becoming deeply significant to all nations; these will be of special importance to the Middle East given its current dependence upon carbon energy production. Yet, one new issue is of special importance given the U.S.-Iranian relationship, that is, the issue of the role of the last superpower, the U.S., in the international system. The U.S. is now being increasingly challenged by new powers. While India and Russia work to improve their positions within the international system, the rise of Chinese hard and soft power is perhaps the greatest surprise. Many of these states may interpret the U.S. failure in Iraq was a sign of the superpower's weakness. If Iran and, by extension, Iraq were to side with China against the U.S., what would this say about U.S. hard and soft power?

At the regional level, the issues of the Middle East peace process and the new "rising power" of Iran are critical. The peace process has been structured along the fault line of an Arab/Israeli divide. Over the past two decades, the Arabs have moved away from political-military considerations of this conflict toward economic and diplomatic considerations. Meanwhile, Iran has moved from economic and diplomatic considerations (as under the late Shah) to more political-military considerations. Thus, while the Arab world has integrated with U.S., European, and Israel, Iran has divested from these Western economic systems and has, in fact, become more isolated. The reliance of Iran upon political-military considerations has been harmful to the country in many respects. The fault line is no longer along Arab/Israeli lines but along Iran/Israeli or, by extension, Iran/U.S. lines. This transformation is more a consequence of the Islamic revolution than of U.S. sanctions upon Iran. Wanting to become the leader of the Islamic world, the new Islamic regime was more than happy to fill in for the position that the "defeated" Arab nation had vacated. The opportunity, the new leaders thought, could also elevate Iran to its historic position as "the representative of the East." The July 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon is the first proxy U.S.-Iran war in the region. Because Israel does not wish to confront Iran alone, it has increasingly relied upon the U.S. to check Iran's "rising power." With the Democratic Party now in control of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. willingness to check and negate Iranian "rising power" is likely to increase. The hard power logic seems clear: the solution to the Iraqi problem, perhaps even the key to the solution to Middle East peace process, lies in negating Iranian power.

At the national level, the issues are mostly Iranian. The fact that Iran has prioritized its foreign policy goals according to the following order or significance - i.e., Islamic nations, neighboring countries, regional states (minus Israel), and extra-regional states - is maladaptive. As a consequence of this prioritization, improving Iran's relationship with the U.S. is not viewed as a central Iranian goal. It must be noted that by 2025, Iran will have over 100 million citizens. Such a young and restive population will put great stress upon Iranian political and economic institutions. For example, without a change in the domestic price of oil, Iranian oil production will not be sufficient to keep up with domestic consumption rates. Without such a change, Iran will need to import oil. How will the Iranian regime deal with the shock of raising prices on oil? How will the regime deal with the shock of becoming an oil importer? Neither possibility is likely to be especially pleasant. The Iranians have accordingly sought to develop a civilian nuclear energy industry which will help them to alleviate some of these pressures. In fact, nuclear energy is becoming a critical key (e.g., U.S., Russia, Britain, and Brazil) to the answer throughout the world for the issues of global warming and carbon energy consumption.

Given that many of these issues are significant throughout the world, it is unclear why certain of these issues have crystallized within the U.S.-Iranian relationship. In particular, many automatically consider issues of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights and military nuclearization issues as basic to Iran. They are not. Why they have crystallized around Iran requires reconsideration. With respect to Iraq, it should now be clear that older historical factors have combined with newer factors to produce today's Iraqi problem.

III. The "Rising Power" of Iran Thesis

For reasons both old and new, it is an increasingly common argument that Iran is a "rising power." In fact, it is argued, one of the main reasons Iraq is such a problem is because of Iran's new "ascendancy." The evidence of Iran being a rising power is, furthermore, shown in Iran's nuclear energy and military programs. Advocates of hard power in the U.S., already opposed to Iran, are the primary supporters of this thesis. This argument is reminiscent of the "grave and gathering danger" pretext supplied by President Bush in his 2002 address to the United Nation's General Assembly. Enemies of Iran are not, however, alone; there are friends of Iran who also make the argument that Iran is a "rising power." Before assuming this thesis to be true, it should be examined: Is Iran a rising power? If it is true, is this good or bad? If it is not true, then why is the thesis so often advocated?

There are many kinds of power. Military power is only one form of it, but there is also economic, political, cultural and social, to name only a few. In the 1980s, the USSR had military power, but its other forms of power - the foundations of military power - were very weak. North Korea has a similar mixture of power, an outward appearance of military power with little to no foundation beneath it. Can Iran be compared to these two countries?

Iran's power, whether hard or soft, is negligible when compared to all forms of U.S. power. The U.S. could very easily destroy the country and topple the regime. However, what if it is compared to other regional powers? While Iranian hard power is not greater than that of India or Pakistan, it is greater than that of most GSS and surrounding states. Yet, it is often overlooked that these other states have very strong friends, one might even call such friends "owners." Western governments are deeply invested and involved in these smaller states. With this important point considered, it makes questionable sense to compare too simply Iran's hard power with the hard power of smaller states.
Iran's military may be strong, in a relative sense to smaller local states, but it is very weak when compared to the power of other Western states. It is weak compared to these smaller local states when these Western relationships are considered. It is weak when it is understood that Iranian soft power is considered. Military power must be founded upon other forms of power and it is these very forms that are so very weak in Iran. The thesis that Iran is a "rising power" is not borne out by the evidence. At best Iran may be a "stagnant power" while at worst Iran may be a "falling" or "failing" power.

Would it be good or bad for Iran to be a "rising power?" Even if we assume, contrary to the previous argument, that Iran were a "rising power," we cannot simply assume that it would be a bad thing for Iran to be a "rising power." The historical accounting from the previous section provides evidence that this would not be bad. A stronger Iran would be more secure, friendlier, and more willing to integrate itself into the international system. Iran would be a more stable state and the Middle East as a whole would be a more stable region. Historical evidence points, furthermore, to the fact that Iran is a problem only when it is weak. Iran is an important country is the Middle East with a role to play. It has legitimate national interests and the state requires a certain amount of power in order to secure those interests.

Why then is the "rising power" thesis so commonly argued if it is not true? Iran has many friends and enemies. Both groups have their own reasons for advocating this thesis. Iran's friends may believe that by presenting Iran as a "rising power," Iran might be able to gain a larger basket of carrots at the negotiating table. Yet, what these "friends" fail to realize is that they are help Iran's enemies in their support of a false thesis, a thesis that puts Iran into great danger. Iran's enemies, and these enemies may be found in many places, especially including the Middle East and the U.S., have various motives for presenting Iran as a "rising power." Some of these countries seek to keep the U.S. involved in the region. Some of these countries may even want the U.S. to attack Iran. The motives of Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia should be explored more fully.

In the U.S., the "rising power" thesis is advocated by many who are enemies of Iran, especially conservative Christian and Jewish groups and neoconservatives. This thesis, along with the argument than Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, are being constructed as pretexts for future actions against Iran. It is important to understand the nature of this pretext: It is argued that the U.S. is, quite naturally, upset with Iran because Iran is on the side of its rivals, such as China. Iran is, furthermore, supporting radical Muslims, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has, furthermore, a radical Islamic-fascist regime with a president akin to Adolf Hitler. Pretexts are dangerous for many reasons, including that fact that they help form the linguistic groundwork necessary for future policy actions (ones which have already been determined).

For all of these reasons, the U.S. has been looking for ways (and pretexts) to: (1.) bring Iran to its side; (2.) to reduce its power; and (3.) to change its regime. Hard power advocates in the U.S. believe a reduction in Iranian power would be a minimal goal while regime change would be an optimal outcome. Advocates of soft power argue that bring Iran to the U.S. side would be best and that this could best be done through negotiation. These advocates hold that normalization of relations would be the optimal outcome. President Bush continues to listen only to hard power advocates. However, other U.S. policy makers, such as Senator Chuck Hagel, do seem to understand the importance of soft power arguments.

IV: Chance for War and Normalization

Whereas there are hard and soft power advocates in both the U.S. and Iran, it is not the case that it is equally important for soft power advocates to win in both countries. Naturally, were the soft power advocates to win the debates in their respective countries, the chances for a new era of U.S.-Iranian cooperation to emerge would be greatly enhanced. Evidence indicates that a normalization of relations, with Iran brought around to the U.S. side, would be the best way for this relationship to go forward. Yet, the hard power advocates in both countries are strong and they may well win their respective debates.

The key to the outcome is less the U.S. debate than the one in Iran. It is critical that the soft power advocates there win so that Iran can begin to demonstrate why it is worthy of trust. This may not be fair, given the history of this relationship, but it may simply be necessary. The moderates, seeking normalization, must win. They can take actions that help U.S. leaders and policy makers to achieve a new understanding of Iran. They will need to be courageous in their leadership. At a minimum, Iran will need to: (1.) suspend enrichment activities; (2.) work with the U.S. over stabilizing Iraq; and (3.) accept to negotiate bilaterally with the U.S. on issues such as Israel and nuclear proliferation.

For U.S. policy makers, it will be helpful to reconsider the issues raised in this analysis, especially issues of perception and trust. Given the nature of the spiral conflict that has characterized this relationship and the dynamics which accompany it, policy makers need to be wary of the line between fact and fiction. The historical evidence supports the case that Iran is a nonbelligerent state which, when more secure with power proportionate to its regional role, can provide a useful and stabilizing role in the Middle East. It need not be an enemy. It can, in fact, be a good friend to the U.S. Recognizing the old patterns of misperception and mistrust as well as understanding how new issues (global, regional, and national) influence the U.S.-Iranian relationship, are critical to moving forward into a new era of "spiral cooperation."

Thank you.