Advocates of both peace and war exist on both sides. It is often said, whether by the U.S. government or the Iranian, that while the government of the opposing country might be extreme and difficult, the people of that country are good, trustworthy and interested in peace. Yet, such statements can be misleading as they do not give due importance to the power of organized interest groups, that is, factions. Factions have always been a problem for the creation of sound public policy. That such factions will have a great effect upon the U.S.-Iranian debate is not in doubt (for example: Joshua Muravchik of AEI).

The Bush Administration appears to have only two basic policy prescriptions for Iran: (1.) Reduce the power of Iran before it rises too far so that it cannot be a threat to U.S. or regional interests; or (2) Change the regime so that a less extreme one can direct the course of the country. A third option, that conversation and diplomacy can be made to work with the support of tough international economic sanctions, seems to be taken less seriously by the Bush Administration. While the implications of these first two policy prescriptions are likely to be highly negative for both countries, certain factions may perceive either of them to yield useful political benefits.

The metaphor of the "chess game" only goes so far given the involvement of multiple players. It is also problematic because Iran is not only a player but also a pawn. It is important to recognize the roles played by other states, especially China, Russia, the E.U. and, of course, Israel. The Israeli government, for example, has repeatedly signaled a red line in its unwillingness to tolerate an Iranian enrichment program, whether one of an R&D nature or one on an industrial scale. According to UPI, Reuters, and other agencies, Israel has not only sought permission from the U.S. for an air corridor over Iraq in order to strike Iranian targets but has also made similar inquiries to Qatar, Oman and the UAE. One report by UPI notes that European states have put pressure on Turkey to open its airspace to a possible Israeli attack.

The Iranian side too is divided between advocates of various positions. The difficulty within this "player" derives from the political advantages gained by extremist factions in adopting radical arguments and policies which destabilize the country. By keeping Iranian citizens motivated by fear and anger, the democratic nature of the Iranian state is undermined and Iranian public policy debates are subsequently corrupted. Thus, while the Iranian people may in general want a third way - normalized relations - many powerful factions in Iran would simply not benefit from a condition of normalized politics.

While the U.S. and Iran have many positive things in common, from common values and common interests, it seems that they also have this one less than positive thing in common, that is, both countries have public policy debate arenas populated by powerful factions that stand to benefit politically from policies that do not actually benefit the majority of peoples of the two countries.

The American Iranian Council (AIC) believes in the importance of public policy debates that are free, open and direct. Reasoned understanding cannot be achieved without these preconditions being met. Quality policy debates are difficult enough to have under normal conditions, but with the complexity of the international chess game now playing out, the possibilities that extremist factions will hijack the debate for their own purposes must always recognized and guarded against. The AIC believes that peace should not only be the goal of this game but that the only means by which this game should be played are those that are peaceful.