The U.S., for its part in this conflict, has its own set of legitimate national and international interests at stake in this contemporary relationship. The war in Iraq has not gone well. It has greatly complicated the U.S. bid to retain is place in the international political system. While U.S. overall power is not in dispute, the fact that this debacle has even occurred at all cannot be ignored by state and non-state actors. A loss, even a perceived loss, will be met with questions throughout the world as to how the last remaining superpower could have put itself in such a position, one from which it could not extricate itself. In particular, China must surely question the role of the U.S. in the future international system, especially vis-à-vis its own role.

Iran, for its part, has its own national and regional interests at stake. Fundamental to these interests are its energy security and its place in the region. Iran's large population and economy make it an important regional actor. It has legitimate interests in the region. It has a long history of political and economic relationships with states in the region. While Iran may well look at the growing discomfort of the U.S. as its debacle increases in scope with a degree of pleasure, it cannot be said that Iran actually wishes for the destabilization of the country. Iran's security requires that Iraq remain relatively stable. There are various reasons for this, including the sizable Kurdish populations in Iran as well as potentially large influxes of refugees.

Although it is possible to mistake the current declarations of both states as signs of inherent hostility, it is helpful to more carefully consider many of these statements as rhetorical flourishes in a game which remains essentially diplomatic. Any solution to this conflict requires that both the interests - that is, "legitimate" interests" - of the U.S. and Iran be taken into account. Any solution that fails to take such legitimate interests into account is unlikely to be of lasting value.

Great attention is often given, for example, to the role of Iran in Iraq. It is true that Iranian involvement takes many forms, yet these forms are certainly not new. Iran's economic involvement in Iraq is now being given attention in the West, yet this involvement is certainly not new and should not be unexpected. The U.S. certainly has similar economic interests in Canada and Mexico. The U.S. certainly has similar interests in countries throughout the Middle East. It should be that both U.S. and Iranian economic interests could compliment one another in securing the stability of Iraq.

If both states continue to feel threatened by the other then the current conflict will continue. Given the many rhetorical flourishes originating from these two states, it is not unreasonable that both should question the other's sincerity in having a mutual and meaningful dialogue. President Bush's assertion that Iran is a charter member of the "Evil Empire" cannot have improved the relationship. President Ahmadiejad's hard line and confrontational approach, infused with hyperbolic rhetoric, also cannot have improved this relationship. Although there might be political advantages to speaking such words, they do not contribute to the sort of mutual respect and recognition that is needed for these two countries to move forward. A stable relationship requires better and more respectful communications.

The Iranian nuclear enrichment program remains the single greatest obstacle to any U.S.¬Iranian rapprochement. The involvement of Iran in Iraq is viewed by many experts as simply another pretext formulated by the U.S. to gain support for an already formulated political-military program. The Iranian enrichment program, on the other hand, cannot so easily be dismissed.

Experts agree that Iran must do something to satisfy its very real energy shortcomings. If the enrichment program is one solely for the purpose of complimenting the Iranian energy sector, which is at a serious crossroads, then the Iranian rationale for nuclear enrichment is well-founded and sensible. If, on the other hand, it is more than this and is a clandestine program for constructing military weapons, then the program's rationale is no longer acceptable. While it is true that Israeli nuclear weapons have not received the sort of attention that other nations in the region have received, e.g., Pakistan and India, the addition of more nuclear weapons states in the region cannot be a positive and stabilizing influence. Other ways other than building more weapons should be found to deal with nuclear proliferation issues.

The U.S. acceptance of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs naturally complicates the matter, especially in terms of the logic that the U.S. seeks to apply. It should not be thought that Iran would immediately accept the difference as based upon India and Pakistan being "good actors" and Iran being a "bad actor."

Recent U.S. moves with respect to North Korea, however, provide some room for optimism. The more pragmatic approach advocated by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seems to be gaining ground on the more hard-line ideological ground occupied by Vice-President Dick Cheney. If the North Korean situation can be controlled and a peaceful resolution achieved, then this should be a proven template within which the U.S. and Iran might work. The denuclearization of the Libyan problem is a second example of how a more pragmatic approach can be made to work among actors that are interested in talking and achieving economic goals.

Both the U.S. and Iran should certainly be able to find room in moving toward a Middle East in which economic stability and growth are paramount. It is only when political-military interests are elevated beyond their necessary and sufficient levels that the two states move into a far more problematic set of relations. Hard power solutions are not solutions. Both states should come to realize the importance, if not necessity, of returning to seeking advances in soft power and playing by a more peaceful set of international standards and rules.