Iran has "defied" the Council's previous demands and is expected to do the same again. Iran is not willing to suspend its uranium enrichment operations even temporarily. Publicly, the Islamic Republic has argued that the uranium enrichment for peaceful purpose is its "inalienable right," and that it is operating, except for "a few mistakes," within the Non-Proliferation Treaty it has signed in 1970. The International Atomic Energy Agency has found Iran in "non-compliance" with the NPT's Safeguard Agreements, but has not determined that it has diverted enrichment operations toward military purpose.

Privately, however, Iranian authorities have expressed fear that the temporary suspension will become permanent. This fear is based on at least two considerations. First, Iran feels that the negotiations will be dragged for an indefinite period of time when the suspension must remain in effect. This will cause Iran to loose momentum in its progress toward more technological breakthroughs while it pacifies its scientists and technicians. Second, in the absence of an alternative idea as the target aim of the negotiations, suspension will lead to zero-enrichment option sought by the United States.

To convince Iran to temporarily halt its enrichment operations to allow for direct negotiations with the US, members of the 5+1 group must address these two Iranian concerns. To address the first concern, that the suspension will not become permanent, members of the group must accept that: one, Iran has the right, within the framework of NPT, to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; and two, the conditional suspension of Iran's enrichment operations and the direct negotiations to find a solution will take place within a definite time table, say 6 months.

To address the second Iranian concern, namely that the negotiations will lead to a mutually acceptable solution, the group must be prepared to entertain the idea of a jointly owned international consortium. There are four key conditions that must be met in this regard. First, that all nation willing to join the consortium must have the right to do so; second, that Iran must not be allowed to move in the direction of building nuclear weapons; third, that the consortium will operate in Iran as well as in other countries willing to host it; and four, that only after Iran's fuel needs are met, the consortium can serve other consumers.

To initiate the international consortium, and as Dr. Javad Zarif, Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations, told me in a recent interview at his New York office, "the interested nations, including the US, can purchase shares in all Iran's nuclear plants and enrichment facilities." The Ambassador did not concede that Israel could also join the Iranian side of the consortium. However, he remained silent when I insisted that Jewish investors, along with other private venture capitalists, must be allowed to participate in an enlarged consortium to make Israel also accept the solution. The idea of the consortium was initiated by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in September 2006.

The important question is this: can the international consortium idea guarantee that Iran will never divert toward building nuclear weapons?  The answer is yes if it were implemented well and complemented by other measures. Because many countries will own the consortium, their experts will be directly involved in its operations and monitoring. The UN Security Council can require additional surprise and intrusive inspections to increase transparency. Iran is currently evasive of such inspections as it feels disrespect. However, under the consortium arrangement, this feeling will not arise.

To make sure that Iran stays with the peaceful use of its nuclear programs, the Council can legally oblige Iran to never withdraw from NPT and never hide or bury any nuclear facilities. It can also deny Iran of the right to nationalize any part of the consortium operating on its soil. More importantly, the Security Council can place a limit on how much uranium Iran can enrich locally at any given year, and prevent Iran from reprocessing the spent fuel altogether. Furthermore, the Council can mandate that all international transactions regarding nuclear plants and programs on the Iranian soil be only allowed through the consortium.

The United States has made the suspension of nuclear enrichment by Iran as a precondition for opening direct talks with Tehran. The Islamic Republic should heed this US demand if Washington were to entertain the idea of an international consortium, which provides the safest option, save for the zero-enrichment option that Iran has already rejected. If diplomacy is at all on the table for the United States in dealing with the Iranian challenge, then moving from the idea of "suspension for suspension" to the idea of suspension for a consortium will have the best chance to provide the conditions for a comprehensive settlement of US-Iran disputes. ___________________________________________________________________________
Hooshang Amirahmadi is a Professor at the Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, and President of the American Iranian Council. New Brunswick and Princeton, New Jersey.