I will like to hare the plan of the sixth Iranian Parliament and its actions in respond to the post-9/11 era. Before I get to that, it is necessary to explain the political context of the time. Iran has two elected offices sharing political power: the Majlis (Parliament), and the President. At the same time, it also has various appointed positions of political power under supervision of the Supreme Leader, including the Judiciary, and the Supreme Council on National Security (SCNS). The elected offices were, for the most part, in hands of Reformists who supported of the normalization of Iranian-U.S. relations. The rest of Iran's political power was in hands of anti-Reformist Conservatives who were against any negotiation with the U.S. as long as the Iranian Presidency and Cabinet was in the hands of Khatami and the Reformists. Thus, the role of the Majlis was to back the Reformist administration's efforts to initiate official talks with the United States.

The strategy of the Majlis was to support the administration in its efforts to engage the U.S. and its allies over issues with Afghanistan, supporting its interim government due to Iran's national interest in peace and security on its eastern border. With Afghanistan as Iran's neighbor, with an almost 800-kilometer boundary, we would be directly affected by any positive or negative developments there, so of course Iran wanted to be engaged in enabling Afghanistan to have a peaceful and prosperous future.

During the months following the events of 9/11, the Majlis had condemned the terrorist actions in the United States. At the same time, it was the analysis of some of its Members that the purpose behind the United States government's decision to invade Afghanistan was to transfer energy resources of the Central Asia countries through Afghanistan.

The Majlis immediately voted to launch a "Special Commission of the Region's Transformation and Afghanistan" in order to be more effective in its decision-making processes, in transferring the ideas of the Majlis, providing advice, and overseeing the government apparatus on these issues. The Special Commission was made up of 15 MPs, and had daily sessions for months. This Commission was in addition to the National Security and Foreign Affairs Commission and the Speaker's membership in the Supreme Council of National Security (SCNS).

The goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran was to defend Afghanistan's sovereignty. The Majlis directly supported official talks with the U.S. government. The multilateral negotiations were successfully performed between Iran and the U.S. and its allies by the Khatami administration. However, President Bush's State of the Union Address on the "Axis of Evil" damaged the Reformist administration's position on engaging in talks with the U.S. The new administration should appreciate and facilitate any constructive approach and cooperation of Iran in the region.

The Majlis played a unique role in criticizing some of the positions that the Supreme Council of National Security took, such as its decision to be neutral in this engagement. We in the Majlis believed that we should proactively engage in a meaningful dialogue with the main players, namely the U.S. and its allies, rather than sit quietly next door and just let them all decide how things would turn out in Afghanistan.

Domestic Iranian Politics

Regarding U.S.-Iran relations, it seems that there is a sort of consensus among scholars, experts on foreign relations, political activists and most policy makers inside Iran that the US-Iran talks should be start from national security perspective. However, in terms of how to start these negotiations, timing, topics, conditions, third parties, and internal negotiators are still points of discussion and debate. For example, the Supreme Leader gave a speech in Mashhad in 2007 in which he said that if he knows it would benefit for Iran, he would start negotiations with the U.S. The fact that he gave such an answer in public shows the extent of the compromise among experts and the breakdown of the taboo against talking with the U.S. This statement also shows that he may actually allow that negotiation in the future.

What has changed since the 6th Majlis is the unification of power under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. The current administration would like to start negotiations with the U.S. However, the conditions of the negotiations and the methods for starting them are important. One of member of Iranian parliament said that the first condition of negotiation is that the U.S. must demonstrate respect for the nature of Iran's Islamic Republic and avoid an adversarial plan. After 29 years, both countries show many signs of being ready to start these vital negotiations.

Any negotiation should start with Iran's current government, and that means that they should take place before Iran's June 2009 presidential election. The reason for this is that the present administration has the ability to control hardliners who oppose any talks with the U.S. The Conservatives would gain credibility through this, which would lead other branches of the government to support the idea of negotiations. If President Ahmadinejad would not re-elected, and by chance a Reformist candidate such as former prim minister, Mr. Mosavi or former Speaker of Parliament, Medhi Karoubi would be to be elected, the chances of starting comprehensive negotiations would be slim. The opposition to the new president, including from some of those who are in the current administration, could ruin the negotiations.

Many U.S. policy-makers are afraid that Ahmadinejad will be re-elected as a result of initiating these talks. Even if the talk were to begin now, it would not significantly increase Ahmadinejad's chances of re-election, due to internal and economic problems resulting from his mismanagement.

Also, to reply to these concerns about the possible re-election of Ahmadinejad, I would say that it is appropriate to initiate direct official contact between Iran and the U.S. at the parliamentary level prior to the election. After the election, the official talks could continue at the Cabinet level according standard government protocol. My reasons are as follows:

1. The talks between the U.S. government and Iran's Parliament will not give any credit to Ahmadinejad. This is because many of its Members disagree with him, including the Speaker and because it is not at the cabinet level.

2. Any official contact should be pre-approved by the Supreme Leader. Thus, any official contact by the Majlis with the U.S. would require the support of the Leader.

3. They would control hardliners who disagree with initiating direct talk with the U.S. and this control would pave the way of the next President of Iran to continue ongoing project.

4. The Parliament has an important role to play in the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Protocol was signed in 2003, and the Majlis should ratify it, so these talks would provide an opportunity for the ratification.

5. The Parliamentary talks would be powerful and unique due to the particular position of the current Speaker, who is a former head nuclear negotiator, a son of a Grand Ayatollah, a representative of Qom, and a Member of the SCNS, and because of his ability to handle internal negotiations with other institutions.

6. The MPs come from all over Iran and they have the ability to justify this decision to their constituents.

7. Talks at this level would neutralize the role of the U.S. in the coming election. I would support this neutralization because of the complexity and sensitivity of the political game involved in elections.

8. As a feminist, I would say that extending an invitation to Nancy Pelosi for a talk between the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis would provide a model for the women's movement in Iran that would facilitate requests to improve the condition of women in Iran. This issue also would be one of the topics to be discussed by the two Speakers.

Aside from all this, one crucial expectation of political and human rights activists for negotiations at any level is that all that the United States should not ignore human rights violations in Iran. I would say normalization relations between two countries, would reduce human rights violation and promote democracy in Iran. Because, many activists are arrested with accusation of "spying for the United States.
Lastly, recently many analysts believe that the U.S. government should talk directly with the Supreme Leader of Iran. Although the Supreme Leader has ultimate power in Iran, one should not ignore the dynamic of power inside Iran. The significant question is whether the Leader makes decisions completely on his own or whether he is affected by others, and if so, who they are.

One important example of different Iranian approaches to the nuclear talks would demonstrate the weight of other groups in the Iranian political structure: There have been two different Iranian approaches to the nuclear talks. During the Khatami presidency, the focus was on building trust and cooperation with the West, while the approach during the Ahmadinejad era was totally different in that it radiated hostility and projected an unwillingness to deal with the West. The question is how those who say that the U.S. should talk directly with the Supreme Leader justify these different approaches.

Each political camp within the Iranian structure has power and influence, as do other stakeholders. Ignoring this dynamic of power would hurt the success of the negotiations. Therefore, these talks should consider this complexity and should engage all parties directly or indirectly. The United States should start talks by treating Iran as an equal partner in negotiations, without humiliating Iran or addressing it in a condescending manner.